

Multiple Signatory Letter 1

Page 1 of 1

WD0127

From: Bern Allard [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 01, 2008 11:55 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF

1|25.2 | *We, citizens of [REDACTED] Georgia, after considering all information received, have resolved we do not want the NBAF built in [REDACTED]*
B. and G. Allard

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentors' opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Multiple Signatory Letter 2

Page 1 of 2

08/25/2008 11:40 FAX 001 352 3945

WAGGONER ENGINEERING

001

FD0068

**FAX****COVER
SHEET****TO:** Mr. James V. Johnson, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security**FAX NUMBER:** 866-508-6223**FROM:** Hunter T. Arnold, P.E., Vice President**DATE:** 8/25/2008**REGARDING:** Bio-Lab Facility for Flora, Mississippi**PAGES:** 2 (including cover page)*******IF LEGIBLE COPIES OF ALL PAGES ARE NOT RECEIVED, PLEASE
CALL BACK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND ASK FOR SHERRY*********COMMENTS:** Should you have any questions or require further information, please
give me a call.

Thank you.

From the desk of...

Sherry Stanley
Executive AssistantWaggoner Engineering, Inc.
143-A LeFleurs Square
Post Office Box 12227
Jackson, Mississippi 39238-2227**Direct Number:** (601) 914-6312
Office Number: (601) 355-8526, Ext. 312
Fax Number: (601) 352-3945The information contained in this facsimile message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed and may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by telephone and return the original message to us at the above address via the U.S. Postal Service. Thank you.

Multiple Signatory Letter 2

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05/25/2008 11:41 FAX 001 352 3945

WAGGONER ENGINEERING

2002

FD0068

222 Chippewa Circle
Jackson, MS 39211
August 25, 2008

Mr. James V. Johnson
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW, Building 410
Washington, DC 20528


Dear Mr. Johnson:

I understand that a site in Flora, Mississippi is being considered for the proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility. Please accept this letter as an endorsement of the Flora site by my wife and me. We are residents of the capital city Jackson, just 10 miles from Flora; and we believe that the Flora location will be mutually beneficial to the Department of Homeland Security and to the State of Mississippi for the following reasons:

- Nearby medical research facilities at University Medical Center in Jackson, MS
- The nationally-acclaimed Veterinarian School at Mississippi State University
- Excellent quality of life in Flora with choices ranging from rural, to suburban, to urban.

Thank you for considering the site in Flora, Mississippi for the NBAF.

Sincerely,


Hunter (and Tina) Arnold

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative. The decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

1| 24.5

Multiple Signatory Letter 3

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MD0037

U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate
 Attention James V. Johnson
 Mail Stop #2100
 245 Murray Lane, S.W. Bldg. 410
 Washington, D. C. 20528


1| 25.2 A very large percentage of the population in and around [REDACTED] Georgia) have strong objections to having NBAF located close to our densely populated area where human life could be threatened by potential infections. This threat would not only be to our permanent residents, but to thousands of college students as well.

2| 4.2 May I point out that the citizens/taxpayers of our county were NOT consulted as a group before a small group of university administrators and government leaders extended an invitation to NBAF to locate here.....no open meetings, no articles in the newspaper, nothing to familiarize us with the pros and cons of a project that concerns the entire tax base. Without a full explanation, a handful of leaders were presumptuous in proceeding in this process.

3| 24.1 Why would any thoughtful, concerned community approve construction of NBAF? It would change the environment forever, so please choose Plum Island for its location where the research can be ongoing while the citizens of this country may have one less fear in this already depressed nation.

Sincerely,
 Mary C. & Robert H. Ayers

[REDACTED] Georgia



Sunday, July 20, 2008 America Online: AyRbrt

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative based on safety concerns. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Athens. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 4.2

DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding lack of initial consultation with local residents. DHS held a competitive process to select potential sites for the proposed NBAF as described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. A team of federal employees representing multi-department component offices and multi-governmental agencies (i.e., DHS, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Department of Health and Human Services) reviewed the submissions based primarily on environmental suitability and proximity to research capabilities, proximity to workforce, acquisition/construction/operations, and community acceptance. Ultimately, DHS identified five site alternatives that surpassed others in meeting the evaluation criteria and DHS preferences, and determined that they, in addition to the Plum Island Site, would be evaluated in the EIS as alternatives for the proposed NBAF.

DHS is committed to free and open public involvement during development of the NBAF EIS and welcomes comments. Decisions on whether to construct and operate the NBAF and, if so, where, will be based on the analyses presented in the NBAF EIS and other factors such as cost, engineering and technical feasibility, strategic considerations, policy considerations, and public input. A Record of Decision that explains the final decisions will be made available no sooner than 30 days after the NBAF Final EIS is published.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 24.1


DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Multiple Signatory Letter 4

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7855378793 BG-FAX BG Consultants 01:50:47 a.m. 08-25-2008 1-866-608-6223 FD0090

FACSIMILE SHEET



Date: 8-25-08

To: James V. Johnson

Company: U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security

From: Stere Berland

Office/Company: BG Consultants, Inc.
4806 Vue Du Lac Place
Manhattan, KS 66503

Web Site: www.bgcons.com

Email: postmaster@bgcons.com

Phone: (785) 537-7448 Ext. 1106

Facsimile Number: (785) 537-8793

Subject: _____

Number of pages: 3 (including this sheet)

Comments: _____

BG CONSULTANTS, INC.

BG Consultants philosophy minimizes the client's risk by blending in all necessary design disciplines. Investigation is thorough and our solutions are complete. Since its founding, BG Consultants has expanded its professional and technical staff, providing problem solving services to public and private clients on architectural and engineering projects.

BG Consultants' professional staff - including engineers, architects, surveyors and planners - produce creative solutions. Projects are workable, on time and within budget.

BG Consultants focus is on our clients. Our objective is to surround our client with competent professionals providing complete and responsive service. Our success is only measured by our clients satisfaction.

Office locations include:

- Manhattan
- Lawrence
- Hutchinson
- Emporia

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: The documents accompanying this fax transmission belong to the sender and are privileged and confidential. The information is intended solely for the individual named above. If you have received this fax in error please notify us immediately. Thank you for your assistance and cooperation.

PLEASE CALL IF THIS TRANSMISSION IS INCOMPLETE!

Multiple Signatory Letter 4

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7855378793

BG-FAX

BG Consultants

01:51:45 p.m. 08-25-2008

2/3

FD0090

1323 Sheringbrook Dr.
Manhattan, KS 66503

August 25, 2008

Mr. James V. Johnson
Science & Technology Directorate
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Dear Mr. Johnson:

1/24.4 We would like to express our support for locating the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas. We have been residents of Manhattan for 45 years, having moved here to complete academic degrees in both engineering and education at Kansas State University. The College of Engineering at Kansas State University is one of the top ranked engineering schools in the country and produces graduates who have been highly successful in the workforce. Both of us started our professional careers here and have felt very fortunate to live in a community that encourages growth and progress. We have both been very active in our civic community and the university community. Steve founded B-G Consultants, a professional engineering and architectural firm with four locations throughout the state, in 1976. The Manhattan office has approximately 45 employees, 20 of whom are engineers or architects. The turnover rate has been minimal over the past 32 years because employees love the job atmosphere and the community. Several employees have moved here from other states and have chosen to remain. This defines the kind of community that Manhattan is...a supportive community that encourages professional development.

Over the past 45 years we have known numerous military personnel (stationed at nearby Ft. Riley) who have chosen to make Manhattan their home after retirement because it is a good, safe place to raise a family and has an excellent school system. I was a teacher in the public schools at the high school level for 30 years, and I am convinced that there is no finer place for children to receive a preparatory education than in this city.

We also are proud of the progressive direction that both Kansas State University and the city of Manhattan have taken over the past 45 years. Kansas State has a nationally recognized veterinary school, a program of grain and animal research, food safety research program, and a bio-security facility that have all attracted nationally recognized experts and scientists to the university. What a great partnership that would make with NBAF. In addition, the Manhattan Chamber of Commerce has been pro-active in promoting business growth and entrepreneurial endeavors and partnerships.

1Cont.124.4 As in any community, there are always some residents who resist change and who challenge anything new. You have probably heard from some who see nothing but danger in locating the NBAF facility here, but our attitude is that there is risk in most endeavors that are worthwhile. All one has to do is think of what we would not have if

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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7855378793

BG-FAX

BG Consultants

01:53:11 p.m. 08-25-2008


3/3

FD0090


1Cont.[24.4

people had not been willing to take risks. Imagine a world with no vaccinations to control widespread infectious diseases, no advanced medical treatments, or no nuclear power, for example. We believe that the risks of locating the NBAF facility in Manhattan are minimal and are far outweighed by the benefits. We must continue to move forward. We would welcome the choice of Manhattan Kansas for this facility.

Sincerely,



Stephen Berland,
President : B-G Consultants



Deloris Berland
USD 383 English Teacher (retired)

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WD0099

From: Kathleen Bevis [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, July 22, 2008 6:26 PM
To: [REDACTED]

To whom it may concern,
We moved our family from Long Island 13 years ago to flee all the dangers and have a carefree peaceful life here in [REDACTED] NC. Now we have the threat of a Bio Lab right next door and we are not at all happy about it. We request that another area be found for this lab. This is a rural area with livestock and crops of all kinds and we would feel quite threatened having the lab in this area.

Sincerely,

Larry and Kathy Bevis

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative based on safety concerns. The NBAF would be designed and constructed using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

DHS held a competitive process to select potential sites for the proposed NBAF as described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. A team of federal employees representing multi-department component offices and multi-governmental agencies (i.e., DHS, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Department of Health and Human Services) reviewed the submissions based primarily on environmental suitability and proximity to research capabilities, proximity to workforce, acquisition/construction/operations, and community acceptance. Ultimately, DHS identified five site alternatives that surpassed others in meeting the evaluation criteria and DHS preferences, and determined that they, in addition to the Plum Island Site, would be evaluated in the EIS as alternatives for the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.3

See response to comment No: 1.

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KSD011

1 RESOLUTION 06/07/43

2 RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF
3 THE NATIONAL BIO- AND
4 AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY

5 BY: Ashley Boldt, Cody Hill, Katie Maddy, Lucas Maddy, William Lopez, Gayle
6 Spencer, Cameron Addington, Dagnachelle Adrian, Jamie Ball, Patrick Barton,
7 Emily Besler, Katie Beye, Clint Blaes, Peter Boos, Jarrod Bowser, Anthony
8 Carter, Jessica Chipman, Matt Coleman, Gavin Couvelha, Bryan Cox, Annie
9 Dwyer, Mary Fox, Molly Hamm, Ryan Hannebaum, Josh Hersh, Melissa
10 Hildebrand, Piper Hoskins, Nicole Hunter, Kellan Kershner, Matt King, Kyle
11 Lawrence, Kristen Leben, Amanda Lenington, Tim Lindemuth, Madison Loeb,
12 Sam McCord, Mohan-Reddy Metla, Lindsey Miller, Sarah Morton, Jennifer
13 Mosier, William Muir, Jim Mosimann, Sheila Murphy, Varun Muthu-Kumar,
14 Zach Oswald, Jared Palan, Lydia Peele, Nick Piper, Alyssa Provencio, Emily
15 Schmeidler, Amy Schultz, Kyle Sherwood, Kelsey Short, Kyle Spencer, Daryn
16 Soldan, Robert Swift, Taylor Symons, Amanda Thompson, Matt Wagner, James
17 Weemhoff, Tim Weninger, Phil White, Alyssa Williams, Matt Woodward, Tyler
18 Axman, Brigitte Brecheisen, Caitlin Brown, Travis Grove, Sarah Guinane, Emily
19 Haug, Courtney Held, Meg Henry, Kayla Horsky, Jacob Jensen, Sarah Kuhlman,
20 Anne Miller, Paul Mintner, Katie Niederee, Joe Norris, Lindsey Patterson,
21 Melanie Peele, Hannah Sanders, Jared Schnefke, Emily Schneider, Jessica
22 Schultz, Wayne Stoskopf, Robert Tibbitts, Alissa Vogel, Kristel Williams,
23 Amanda Hoffman, Jason Topp, Daniel Atkisson, Tanner Banion, Katelyn
24 Schmidt, Jacob Mitchum, Adi Angel, Julia Debes, Ana Miller, Kevin Keatley,
25 and Andrew Burch
26

27
28 WHEREAS, The City of Manhattan and State of Kansas has applied to the federal government
29 for a \$450 million National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) which could
30 pour \$3.5 billion into the state economy during the first 20 years;
31

32 WHEREAS, NBAF, to be funded by the Department of Homeland Security, has been touted as
33 a world-class research laboratory that could bring up to 500 scientists, engineers
34 and technology specialists to Kansas and create 1,500 construction jobs;
35

36 WHEREAS, The City of Manhattan has pledged \$5 million in economic assistance to help
37 attract the proposed NBAF to Manhattan and specifically K-State;
38

39 WHEREAS, The Biosecurity Research Institute in Kansas will provide a strong starting point
40 for such a facility. U.S. Senator Pat Roberts said, "there are no other sites in the
41 nation, under consideration, that have such an agricultural and animal research
42 base already in place that can serve as the foundation for this building;"
43

44 WHEREAS, Housing the NBAF at K-State would provide students the opportunity for world-
45 class internships and part-time jobs in cutting-edge agricultural research; and
46

Multiple Signatory Letter 6

Page 2 of 2

KSD011

47 WHEREAS, Community support is needed to help attract the NABF to Manhattan and Kansas.

48

49 BE IT RESOLVED THAT:

50

51 SECTION 1. The Kansas State University Student Governing Association supports Kansas
52 State University and the State of Kansas in their bid to secure the National Bio-
53 and Agro-Defense Facility.

54

55 SECTION 2. Upon passage, a copy of this resolution be sent to U.S. Senators Pat Roberts and
56 Sam Brownback, U.S. Representatives Jerry Moran, Nancy Boyda, Dennis
57 Moore, and Todd Tiahrt; Governor Kathleen Sebelius, NBAF Task Force Co-
58 Chairman Lieutenant Governor Mark Parkinson, NBAF Task Force Co-Chairman
59 Dan Glickman, Vice Chairman John Carlin, Vice Chairman Joerg Ohle and all
60 members of the NBAF Task Force; Manhattan Mayor Bruce Sneed, City
61 Commissioners Tom Phillips, Mark Hatesohl, Jayme Morris-Hardeman, and Ed
62 Klimek; K-State President Jon Wefald; Vice President for Institutional
63 Advancement Bob Krause; Provost Duane Nellis; Vice Provost for Research
64 R.W. Trewyn; Assistant to the President Sue Peterson; College of Agriculture
65 Dean Fred Cholic; President of the Kansas Bioscience Authority Tom Thornton;
66 Director of the National Agricultural Biosecurity Center David Franz; and
67 Biosecurity Research Institute Director Jim Stack.

68

69 THIS RESOLUTION PASSED STUDENT SENATE ON MARCH 8, 2007
70 BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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WD0103

From: beth brevoort [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, July 24, 2008 12:06 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Granville Co., NC Bio Lab

1| 25.3 | NO BIO LAB IN GRANVILLE COUNTY
Dennis and Beth Brevoort

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Multiple Signatory Letter 8

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PD0290

August 25, 2008

1| 25.4

We are Carl W. and Mary L. Brockman of [REDACTED] Kansas, and we wish to disagree with the placement of the NBAF facility in Manhattan, Kansas. We are extremely opposed to it. This is an agricultural area and we just do not wish to have it here.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1


Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Multiple Signatory Letter 9

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Revd on 8/18
MD0043



City Of Oxford

Walter Cantley
Bob Shope
Paul Kiesow
Oxford, NC 27565
August 6, 2008

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

US Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson,

We are Commissioners for the City of Oxford, NC, which is the county seat for Granville County.

Concerning the NBAF project scheduled for Butner, NC, County of Granville, we would like for you to consider the following comments and consider them when the decision is made to where the NBAF Labs will be located:

1) 24.3 After attending your presentations on the aforementioned project for the study of animal's diseases, we find your information to be informative and thorough. We wholeheartedly support the project and will do anything within our power to make sure that our citizens are informed and that they hear the truth concerning these matters.

We feel the pulse of the city and county very well, and know that the vast majority of our citizens support this project. We want you here and are looking forward to working with you to achieve this goal.

The people who attend your informative presentations and who speak against the effort are just a small, well-organized, vocal, misinformed segment of our communities. They run from area to area about projects and object to most, using this familiar format. We have heard them before and will again, I am sure. We were embarrassed by their repeated vocal attacks, which were scripted. Some of those were from other counties and some were even from other states. We commend you for your poise in trying to answer their questions and tolerating their verbal antics. They are well known for their objectionable characteristics.

300 Williamsboro Street - P.O. Box 1307 - Oxford, North Carolina - 27565 - Phone (919) 603-1100 - Fax (919) 603-1107

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.3

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative. The decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

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MD0043

1 cont. | 24.3

Please consider the above facts when your decision is made. We live in this beautiful, well-educated area, which is strategically located close to the RDU airport, Oxford/Henderson airport, and Interstate 85. Vance-Granville Community College is just minutes away. This College is prepared for training highly skilled technical area citizens who are anxious to stay in this community that needs long-term employment opportunities. Please consider the Research Triangle Park, the University of North Carolina, N.C. State, Duke, North Carolina Central University, Wake County and Durham Technical Schools. And it should be noted that we are within just a few minutes to Falls Lake, Kerr Lake, and Lake Devin. Granville County now has a large area along I-85, which is designed somewhat similar to the Research Triangle Park and is called Triangle North. All utilities are available which include paved streets. This park is in conjunction with Vance, Warren, and Franklin Counties who have similar developed areas, as well.


You would be a real asset to our communities and we stand ready to help in any way we can to convince you that this is the ideal location for your research project. This would be a win-win situation for both of us. Please do not give up on the Butner site.

Sincerely,

Walter Cantley, Oxford City Commissioner



Paul Kiesow, Oxford City Commissioner



Bob Shope, Oxford City Commissioner



Multiple Signatory Letter 10

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MD0002

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

July 23, 2008

The Honorable Michael Chertoff
Secretary of Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Secretary Chertoff:

1| 25.1

We are writing to reiterate our longstanding opposition to placing a Bio-Safety Level 4 (BSL-4) facility on Plum Island in response to the Department of Homeland Security's proposal to build a new National Bio- and Agro- Defense Facility (NBAF) in the U.S.

2| 1.0

We are proud to support Plum Island's highly skilled, dedicated employees and their critically important mission of protecting this nation's food supply by stopping harmful pathogens before they enter the U.S. Building on its impeccable record over the past decades, we believe it is important for Plum Island to continue conducting critical research and new discoveries as a BSL-3 facility.

In addition, Plum Island is well situated to research contagious animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth. Accordingly, the federal government is in the process of investing \$60 million in improving Plum Island's security and infrastructure, which could allow it to operate safely well into the future as a BSL-3 facility.


3| 23.0

4| 5.1


Since our meeting with former Secretary Ridge in June of 2003 and with you in October of 2005, we have received repeated assurances from the Department of Homeland Security that Plum Island is not a suitable location for BSL-4 research.

We appreciate your attention to our concerns and look forward to working with you to preserve the integrity of our nation's food supply.

Sincerely,



Hillary Rodham Clinton
United States Senate



Tim Bishop
U.S. House of Representatives

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.1

DHS notes the Senator's and Representative's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 1.0

DHS acknowledges the Senator's and Representative's continued support for PIADC's workforce and its important mission, as well as the investment in critical infrastructure upgrades at Plum Island to allow ongoing and future BSL-3 research.

Comment No: 3Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the Senator's and Representative's concern regarding the Plum Island Site Alternative. As noted in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, Plum Island was determined to be a reasonable alternative for the NBAF because it meets NEPA requirements; currently performs much of the NBAF mission research; fulfills a portion of the goals, mission, and criteria identified for the NBAF; and because Plum Island is owned by DHS, it was not necessary to respond to its own request for Expressions of Interest.

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the Senator's and Representative's concern regarding performing BSL-4 research on Plum Island.

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WD0262

From: James&Marsha Czarasty [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 14, 2008 9:43 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: PLUMB ISLAND

To Whom it may concern:

1|25.1 | This is to notify you that we as CT residents are against raising the Plumb Island Facility to a Bio
Safety Level 4 Facility. Thank you for your attention.
James and Marsha Czarasty
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Ct [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Multiple Signatory Letter 12

Page 1 of 1

WD0301

From: John Filer [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2008 1:01 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF

Aug. 16,2009

1|25.3 I am writing today as a concerned citizen of the state of North Carolina.
My husband and I oppose the NBAF facility.
It would be a grave mistake.
Thank you.
Joppin and Jane Filer

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Multiple Signatory Letter 13

Page 1 of 1

MD0024

██████████
 ████████ GA ████████
 4 August 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
 Science and Technology Directorate
 James V. Johnson
 Mail Stop #21000
 245 Murray Lane, SW, Bldg. 410
 Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson:

- 1| 25.2 We want to add our voices to those of others in our community who have expressed discomfort at the idea of moving the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility from Plum Island to Athens, Georgia. The selected location next to the State Botanical Garden and surrounding residential and small agricultural areas leads us to believe the site unsuitable. Should dangerous pathogens escape the laboratory, who will suffer the consequences? Our community will.
- 2| 13.2
- 3| 21.2
- 4| 15.2 Many will support the presence of this facility because of the held-out hope of jobs; however, information regarding the types and numbers of potential jobs has been lacking. But above all, guarantees of safety are hard to believe (we remember the escaped pathogens in Britain).
- 5| 5.1 Why not upgrade the Plum Island facility? Could the cost of dismantling it, building a new laboratory, and moving existing employees be less than an upgrade?

We hope the Department will listen to the many citizens opposed to the relocation of the NBAF and carefully make the right decision. Thank you for the opportunity to express our opinions.

Sincerely,

Coburn Freer
Mona Freer

Coburn Freer
 Mona Freer

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 13.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the proximity of the South Milledge Avenue Site to the Botanical Garden. As indicated in Sections 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.3.3 of the NBAF EIS, construction and normal operations of the NBAF would have no direct impact on the State Botanical Garden. The NBAF would affect primarily pasture areas that have low wildlife habitat value due to their disturbed condition, lack of native vegetation, and lack of wildlife food and cover. The forested portion of the South Milledge Avenue Site along the Oconee River is a high value riparian wildlife corridor that connects the Botanical Garden with Whitehall Forest. However, impacts to the forested riparian area would be minor (0.2 acre), and these impacts would occur within the existing pasture fence-line in areas that have been disturbed by grazing. The high value forested riparian corridor would be preserved; and therefore, the proposed NBAF would not have significant direct impacts on wildlife. The potential impacts of an accidental release on wildlife are addressed in Section 3.8.9. Although the NBAF EIS acknowledges the potential for significant wildlife impacts in the event of an accidental release, the risk of such a release is extremely low (see Section 3.14). It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas and in areas with abundant wildlife. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF. Furthermore, the purpose of NBAF is to combat diseases that could have significant effects on wildlife. Research at the NBAF would include the development of vaccines for wildlife that could prevent adverse impacts from a foreign introduction.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the impact of a pathogen release on the local population, livestock industry, businesses and infrastructure. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. The chances of an accidental release are low. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Appendix B describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not

been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As discussed in Section 3.14.3.4, employees and contractors would be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 4

Issue Code: 15.2

DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding employment. The number of short-term and permanent jobs are discussed in Section 3.10 of the NBAF EIS. It is expected that approximately 2,700 direct temporary jobs would result from construction of the NBAF, with many of the jobs being filled locally. Approximately 483 permanent jobs, including the initial 326 direct jobs, would result from operation of the NBAF, with much of the scientific work force relocating to the region.

Comment No: 5

Issue Code: 5.1

The proposed NBAF requires BSL-4 capability to meet mission requirements (DHS and USDA). PIADC does not have BSL-4 laboratory or animal space, and the existing PIADC facilities are inadequate to support a BSL-4 laboratory. Upgrading the existing facilities to allow PIADC to meet the current mission would be more costly than building the NBAF on Plum Island, as discussed in Section 2.4.1 of the NBAF EIS.

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WD0028

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 7:44 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF

1) 25.2 I am writing to formally let you know we are adamantly opposed to the building of the National Bio and Agro-defense facility in Athens, Georgia. The establishment of this facility who would totally inappropriate for our community, from the dangerous prospect of contamination being released from infected insects, the inappropriate usage of 43 million gallons of water needed (we are in a on-going severe drought) to your own findings:

2) 21.2
3) 12.2
2 cont. 21.2 On one of the last pages of the DEIS is a chart that shows "site-specific risk based on potential infections." They tell us "that with the exception of Plum Island, each of the proposed sites resides in an area where the wildlife, vegetation, agriculture, and human populations provide ample opportunity for each of the viruses to become established and spread rapidly once released from NBAF."

We are determined to win this argument.

John and Renee Gillick
[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding an accidental release of a vector, such as a mosquito, from the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for outside insect vector penetration, laboratory-acquired infections, vector escape and accidental releases. Section 2.2.1.1 of the NBAF EIS, provides a discussion of the biosafety fundamentals, goals and design criteria for the NBAF operation. Section 3.14 and Appendix E investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts each of which has the potential to release a vector. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release of a vector are low. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures (SOPs) and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6, would be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. An analysis of potential consequences of a pathogen (e.g. Rift Valley fever [RVF] virus) becoming established in native mosquito populations surrounding the South Milledge Avenue Site is specifically addressed in Sections 3.8.9 and Section 3.10.9.1, as well as in Section 3.14.4.1. Section 3.10.9.1 discusses the relative suitability of the regional climate of the South Milledge Avenue Site to promote mosquito survival and virus spread. As such, the RVF response plan would include a mosquito control action plan, and the potential consequences of pesticide use in mosquito control would be evaluated during the preparation of a site specific response plan.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

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CD1506

1| 27.0



Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 27.0

DHS notes the commenter's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site and information provided.

Multiple Signatory Letter 15

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
Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Multiple Signatory Letter 15

Page 3 of 3




Multiple Signatory Letter 16

Page 1 of 2

JUL 29 2008 11:20AM

NO. 131 P. 1

FD0004

 **KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON**
United States Senator • Texas

TO: Under Secretary Jay Cohen

FAX #: 202-254-5704

FROM: Christi Schwartz

PHONE: (202) 224-5370 **DATE:** July 29, 2008

PAGES: 2 (including this cover sheet)

NOTE: Thanks!

284 Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510-4304 • (202) 224-5922 • Fax (202) 224-0776

Multiple Signatory Letter 16

Page 2 of 2

JUL 29 2008 11:21AM

NO. 131 P. 7 FD0004

United States Senator
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
July 28, 2008

The Honorable Jay Cohen
Under Secretary for Science and Technology
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Admiral Cohen:

We write to you today to urge your strong consideration of the Texas Biological and Agro-Defense Consortium (TBAC) in San Antonio as you prepare to make the final site determination for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). We believe the TBAC application meets the requirements set forth by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and would be an excellent choice for this facility.

By locating the NBAF in San Antonio, DHS would have immediate access to a number of outstanding research facilities and personnel. The Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research (SFBR) operates the nation's only privately-owned biosafety level 4 high containment research laboratory and has an impeccable safety record. DHS would also benefit from the close proximity of other important initiatives within the Science and Technology Directorate, including the National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense at Texas A&M University and the University of Texas at El Paso, a co-leader of the DHS Center for Border Security and Immigration. San Antonio's biomedical community already accounts for over 100,000 jobs in the area and works closely with the military, academic and national security community.

Throughout the site selection process, DHS has stressed the important role the community plays in this decision. The San Antonio area is home to an ethnically diverse, well-trained, and experienced workforce. The city's economic base is strong and the quality of life is superb. Additionally, San Antonio already supports many national security and homeland defense organizations, including 5th Army, which is the operational organization for NORTHCOM's response to disasters and homeland defense. The community has offered overwhelming support for the facility, and there has been no public opposition to the NBAF.

With its central location, diverse economy, and highly skilled workforce combined with a unique combination of intellectual research capacity and agriculture stakeholders, San Antonio is an ideal location for the NBAF, and we urge you to strongly consider the Texas Biological and Agro-Defense Consortium. We look forward to working with you to ensure the success of this facility.

Sincerely,

Ray Bailey Antichien *John Cornyn*

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.6

DHS notes the Senator's support for the Texas Research Park Site Alternative. The decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

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WD0776

From: The Ingrams [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 4:19 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: No NBAF in Kansas!

To Whom It May Concern:

- 1|25.4 | We very adamantly oppose construction of the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility at Kansas State University
2| 21.4 | in Manhattan, KS. The risks to the local population and livestock far outweigh any benefits such a facility would
3| 5.0 | bring to this area. It is our firm conviction that this facility should never be placed in any populated area but should
remain on an island where any possible outbreaks could be contained much more easily.
- 1| 25.4 | Please refrain from constructing this facility in Manhattan, Kansas, or at any of the other locations under
cont. | consideration where the population would be placed at risk. Anything else would defy common sense!

Sincerely,

David & Ursula Ingram
[REDACTED]Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the NBAF site alternatives, in particular, the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding risks to humans and livestock. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated on the U.S. mainland. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art biocontainment features and operating procedures to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, 3.14, and Appendices B, D, and E of the NBAF EIS, provide a detailed analysis of the consequences from a accidental or deliberate pathogen release. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the NBAF. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's safety concern. As described in Section 2.4.3 of the NBAF EIS, other potential locations to construct the NBAF were considered during the site selection process but were eliminated based on evaluation by the selection committee. It was suggested during the scoping process that the NBAF be constructed in a remote location such as an island distant from populated areas or in a location that would be inhospitable (e.g., desert or arctic habitat) to escaped animal hosts/vectors; however, the evaluation criteria called for proximity to research programs that could be linked to the NBAF mission and proximity to a technical workforce. The Plum Island Site is an isolated location as was suggested while still meeting the criteria.

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Aug 20 06 06:42a Bill & Eileen Jackson

p.1

FD0023

WHY TAKE CHANCES!

1|21.4 Why would we want to take chances with our lives, others lives and the animals and land around us that we have cared for all of our lives? What would make us want to upset our community, state and country? What happened to common sense and our love of family, friends, community and state? We seem to be devastated by a tornado, hurricane, flood and other catastrophes that we have no control over. If all of this is true, then why do we want to promote a LAB in the center of KSU campus and the city of Manhattan? Why would people of our community support this!!!! There is no love thy neighbor as thy self, it is love the dollar and take a chance with yourself and everyone around you for the love of money! Why can we not realize that the opposition in the other communities is due to the people who care and support each other and their livelihoods and are not so greedy as to jeopardize everyone and everything around them for financial benefits?

3|4.4 It is sad to me that there was no advance notice to the public meeting held July 31 at KSU union. My family has been interested in this since we first heard about it, however we learned about the meeting by reading an editorial in the Grass & Grain newspaper. We did not get a newspaper with any notice information until the day of the meeting. (We get our newspaper a day late, because we are on a rural route.) I have been taught that Public Notice needs to be 10 days in advance and it seems like it needs to be by TV, radio and newspaper, unless personal notification is given. Why were we in the Manhattan community not given this prior information? I guess maybe I have been misleading, but I have believed that I lived in the USA and not a county where "one sneaks in the backdoor to get what they want"!

4|5.0 I believe this LAB needs to be on an Island away from people and animals, to protect each and every one of them. You are not dealing with the common cold here; you are dealing with the most dangerous in the world. Treat them as such, and protect the citizens of Kansas and the USA! This being said common sense says anyone can tell that is best for everyone.

2|15.4 Give me a good reason for putting this LAB for the most dangerous pathogens in the world in the middle of a university campus, surrounded by child care facility, a nursing home for the aged all within shouting distance, of the LAB. I can tell you that common sense has not been considered—greed and money seem to be the only reasons given—and believe it or not,

cont.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commenter's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500-year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's viewpoint. The economic effects of construction of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative are included in Section 3.10.4 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 4.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. In accordance with NEPA regulations (15 day notice required) public meeting notice for the Manhattan Campus Site meeting was published in the Manhattan Free Press on July 14 and July 21, and in the Manhattan Mercury on July 17 and July 25. The Notice of Availability for the NBAF EIS was published in the Federal Register on June 27, which also provides details for all the public meetings regarding the NBAF. The NBAF web site (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>) and designated NBAF reading rooms located at the Manhattan Public Library and Hale Library also advertised the meetings. Interested parties who are the NBAF stakeholder mailing list received direct notification by mail. DHS supports a vigorous public outreach program and encourages public input on matters of national and international importance.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 show that even though Plum Island has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. The lower potential effect is due both to the water barrier around the island and the lack of livestock and susceptible wildlife species.

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Aug 20 06 06:42a Bill & Eileen Jackson

p.2

12

FD0023

1 cont. | everyone I have heard talk in favor of it tends to be one who would benefit
15.4 | economically. Is that a good enough reason to jeopardize KSU,
MANHATTAN, KANSAS AND THE USA?

5/25.4

I BELIEVE NOT!

Eileen Jackson

KS

Comment No: 5

Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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WD0195

From: Cynthia Jones [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 06, 2008 8:52 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NO THE THE NBAF IN INC

1|25.3 | WE ARE HORRIFIED TO THINK THAT THIS ORGANIZATION IS TRYING TO
CONTAMINATE OUR COMMUNITY BY MOVING TO
NORTH CAROLINA. WE WANT OUR VOICES HEARD AND TO BE COUNTED IN THE NO
VOTE TO BRING NBAF TO BUTNER.

WE MOVED TO NC FOR A CLEANER AND HEALTHIER ENVIRONMENT THAT WHERE WE
LEFT. WE SAY NO NO NO!

ROBERT & CYNTHIA JONES
[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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WD0106

From: kath.market [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 25, 2008 10:24 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: No to NBAF

1/25.3 | My husband, Schaefer had been growing in NC all his life and he loves NC for its nature. I just moved here from Rochester where Schaefer and I went to college last summer. I could see why he loves NC. We enjoy living here even though the city of Raleigh is blooming and the nature is getting less. We are fine with more houses, stores, restaurants, and offices building here as long as they're not hazard to environment. But we're not fine with NBAF planning to move to this beautiful state from an isolated island off the coast of NY. We consider it as a threat to environment. Again, please don't let NBAF move here.

Please consider this for the lives of NC seriously.

Jennifer and Schaefer Kath

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative based on threats to the environment. The NBAF would be designed and constructed using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

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WD0291

From: Katherine Kaufman [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 15, 2008 3:41 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF

Mr. James V Johnson
US Dept of Homeland Security: Science & Technology Directorate

1/24.4 | The National Bio & Agro-Defense Facility needs to be located at Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas. Kansas supports it, K-State supports it, I support it; and I hope that you will support it. What a great place to locate, given K-State's nationally known contributions to science as it relates to food/agriculture and animal research.
Thank you for listening.
Katherine and Gary Kaufman
[REDACTED]


Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative. The decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

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MD0033



National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement Comment Form

Personal information is optional as this document is part of the public record and may be reproduced in its entirety in the final National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement.

Name: Milton & Jean Kutner

Title: _____

Organization: _____

Address: _____

City: _____ State: NC Zip Code: _____

Comments: We are writing to state our great concern for our health & well being and the health of many others, and I ask not to build the NBAF near Butner, N.C. We do believe in research, to find treatments or vaccines for the many diseases that plague us all. This job to research animal and animal-to-human diseases (to) located in the Butner, N.C. area would present us who live in the area with a high-level of danger.

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Sincerely
Milton & Jean Kutner
Milton Kutner & (Continued on back for your convenience)
Jean S. Kutner

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative based on safety concerns. The NBAF would be designed and constructed using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

1/25.3

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WD0203

From: Dwaine & Ann Lane [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 07, 2008 8:51 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Don't put Hoof 'n Mouth in Kansas

1|25.4; While I recognize the need for study on hoof & mouth disease, it is
 2|21.4 sheer idiocy to put the "research" facility in the midst of a cattle
 producing state. WHEN it gets "loose," and it will, check the ways it
 can be loosed, when it is "accidentally" loosed, what sense does it make
 to destroy an entire economy, to say nothing of the potential for human
 involvement, and no, no one can say that this is not a possibility, not
 with the "research" that involves mutation, etc.

3|5.1 If you can build it here, you can RE-BUILD it on Plum Island, where at
 least there is a modicum of security albeit it natural.

2 cont. | No one, not even your facility, can make anything safe anymore. There
 21.4 are too many factions and factors to be even reasonably safe.

1 cont. | It does not make sense to put a cattle disease in the midst of a cattle
 25.4 economy. Sheer lunacy.

Thank you,
 Ann Lane
 [REDACTED] KS

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the impact from a release of foot and mouth disease from NBAF operations at the Manhattan Campus Site. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS present the analysis of a variety of accidents that could occur and the potential consequences. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low.

The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. As detailed in Section 3.14.3.4, employees and contractors would be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, would be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.

While the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, the economic effect would be significant for all sites. DHS cannot guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident. However, the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. The economic impact of an accidental release, including the impact on the livestock-related industries, is presented in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D. The major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a potential ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free.

Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site, site-specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area, to include agricultural livestock. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. Emergency response plans would include the current USDA emergency response plan for foot and mouth disease, which includes compensation for livestock losses.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 show that even though Plum Island has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. The lower potential effect is due both to the water barrier around the island and the lack of livestock and susceptible wildlife species.

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08/22/2008 14:15 9195753034

TOWN OF BUTNER

PAGE 01/02

FD0046

Town of Butner
600 Central Avenue
Butner, NC 27509
Tel 919-575-3032 Fax 919-575-3034

*Thomas W. Lane, Mayor**Thomas S. Marrow, Town Manager*

August 22, 2008

Mr. James V. Johnson
Director, Office of National Labs
US Department of Homeland Security
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW, Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

VIA FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION TO: 1-866-608-6223 (with hard copy to follow in US Mail)

SUBJECT: Resolution from the Town of Butner Withdrawing Support
for the Proposed NBAF Facility and Opposing its
Location at the Proposed Site near Butner, NC


Dear Mr. Johnson:

The Butner Town Council adopted the attached Resolution at its meeting on August 7, 2008. Please include this document (Butner Town Council's position) in your public comments information that commenced on 8/27 and runs through 8/25/08.

Thank you in advance for your time and attention.

Sincerely,

TOWN OF BUTNER


Dianne E. White, CMC
Town Clerk
(on behalf of the Mayor and Council)

idw
Attachment

C: Mayor Thomas W. Lane and Butner Town Council
Town Manager Thomas S. Marrow
Town Attorney James C. Wrenn, Jr.

An Equal Opportunity / Affirmative Action Employer

Multiple Signatory Letter 24

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08/22/2008 17:24 9195753034

TOWN OF BUTNER

PAGE 01/02

FD0046

Town of Butner

600 Central Avenue

Butner, NC 27509

Tel 919-575-3032 Fax 919-575-3034

Thomas W. Lane, Mayor

Thomas S. Marrow, Town Manager

RESOLUTION


Whereas, the Butner Town Council has previously supported the development of the National Bio-Agricultural Defense Facility (NBAF) and its location near Butner; and

Whereas, citizens of our community have raised questions concerning the facility and its impact upon the area; and

Whereas, the Council expected the Environmental Impact Statement to address its questions, some of which include the following: (1) what security measures will be in place?; (2) what agencies will provide security?; (3) what diseases will be studied?; (4) will there be any limitations on what diseases will be studied?; (5) why are there contradictions in the reports of different federal agencies (i.e. DHS and GAO) concerning the safety of the facility?; (6) will there be a need for aerial spraying?; (7) will aerial spraying, if done, pose a risk to plant and animal life?; (8) what are the total projected costs of improvements to local infrastructure including roads, water and sewer facilities and lines, and other public utilities?; (9) who will incur the costs of upgrading the infrastructure and utilities serving the facility?; (10) what mechanisms will be put in place to safeguard the institutionalized population in and around Butner?; and (11) how will the institutionalized population be evacuated in the event of a release?


Whereas, upon release of the EIS, answers were not forth coming or did not fully address the issues, therefore;

Be It Resolved that the Butner Town Council at its meeting on August 7, 2008 unanimously voted to withdraw its support for the proposed facility and opposes its location at the proposed site near Butner.



Thomas W. Lane, Mayor



Linda R. Jordan, Mayor Pro-Tem


Vicky Cates


John Wimbush


Elbert Oakley


Christene Emory


Edgar Smoak

An Equal Opportunity / Affirmative Action Employer

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentors' concern for security for NBAF operations at the Umstead Research Farm Site. Regardless of location, the NBAF would have the levels of protection and control required by applicable DHS security directives. Security would be provided by a series of fencing, security cameras, and protocols. In addition, a dedicated security force would be present onsite. Additional security could be provided via cooperation with local law enforcement agencies. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) (designated as For Official Use Only) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and would be used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-biocontainment pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process.

The decision to use government or private security forces to protect the NBAF has not been made at this time. Regardless of the decision, NBAF would have the levels of protection and control required by applicable DHS security directives.

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 23.0

The pathogens that would be studied at the NBAF as discussed in Section 2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS include foot and mouth disease virus, classical swine fever virus, vesicular stomatitis virus, Rift Valley fever virus, Nipah virus, Hendra virus, and African swine fever virus. Should the NBAF be directed to study any pathogens not included in the list of pathogens included in the NBAF EIS, DHS and USDA would conduct an evaluation of the new pathogen(s) to determine if the potential challenges and consequences were bounded by the current study. If not, a new risk assessment would be prepared and a separate NEPA evaluation may be required.

Comment No: 3

Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentors' concerns regarding apparent contradictions in government reports. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated on the mainland. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Comment No: 4

Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentors' concerns regarding the need for aerial spraying and its potential environmental risks. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. An analysis of potential consequences of a pathogen (e.g., Rift Valley fever [RVF] virus) becoming

established in native mosquito populations surrounding the Umstead Research Farm Site is specifically addressed in Sections 3.8.9 and 3.10.9.5, as well as in Section 3.14.4.5 of the NBAF EIS. Section 3.10.9.5 discusses the relative suitability of the regional climate of the Umstead Research Farm Site to promote mosquito survival and virus spread.

DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures (SOPs) and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the NBAF. RVF and foot and mouth disease SOPs and response plans would likely include strategies that are similar. However, the RVF response plan would also include a mosquito control action plan. The potential consequences of pesticide use would be evaluated during the preparation of a site-specific response plan.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 5.3

The preliminary cost estimates to construct and operate the NBAF are described in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS. Additional cost information is included in the Site Cost Analysis that can be found on the DHS Web site. The Site Cost Analysis includes site-specific costs including any infrastructure or road improvements required for the NBAF.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 20.3

DHS notes the commentors' concerns regarding safeguarding the institutionalized populations, which is addressed in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. As described in Chapter 3 and summarized in Section 2.5, the impacts of activities during normal operations at any of the six site alternatives would likely be minor. Section 3.14 and Appendix E present the analyses of a variety of accidents that could occur and the potential consequences. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then a site-specific emergency response plan would be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures. The plan would address accidents at the NBAF and would include stipulations for any special-needs populations. However, the need for evacuation, and particularly actions that would affect the special-needs populations, would be a very low probability event.

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentors' opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative

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LEE FARMS

MISSISSIPPI

August 21, 2008

U. S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson:


Please accept this letter as a show of support for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility to be located in Flora, Mississippi.

1) 24.5


With today's technology, we feel the facility is safe and secure and will be an asset to the State. Mississippi has a great quality of life and people will want to move here to work in collaboration with the NBAF. Also with our great educational institutions, there should be no problem in finding qualified personnel.

Thank you for allowing us to show our support for the NBAF.

Respectfully,



Larry E. Lee, Sr.


Verna A. Lee

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative. The decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

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MD0035

**Dakota Rural Action****PO Box 549 Brookings SD 57006**

(605) 697-5204 (605) 697-6230 (fax)

Email: action@dakotarural.org

August 5, 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
 Science and Technology Directorate
 James V. Johnson
 Mail Stop #2100
 245 Murray Lane, SW Building 410;
 Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson,

Dakota Rural Action would like to enter this letter as a public comment for the evaluation of siting alternatives for the construction and operation by the Department of Homeland Security of a proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), as part of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

Dakota Rural Action (DRA) is a grassroots, agriculture and conservation group that organizes South Dakotans around issues facing family farmers and ranchers, natural resources and our unique way of life in rural South Dakota. We are in our 20th year as a statewide, membership-based organization with more than 500 members, including farmers and ranchers, teachers, medical professionals, attorneys, and public officials.

DRA highly regards the research done by the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) to protect the United States' wild animal population and domestic livestock herd from foreign animal diseases. Such research, resulting treatment, and containment information is invaluable to protecting states like South Dakota that would be economically and socially devastated by an outbreak of a disease like Foot and Mouth, Rift Valley Fever and other diseases researched at PIADC.

DRA also recognizes and appreciates the additional funding and consideration being given to building a new facility to expand research on foreign diseases. The National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) will undoubtedly improve the information available to our livestock producers, decrease the impact of a disease outbreak through specialized emergency response planning, and ultimately lead to a healthier livestock herd in the United States.

1| 5.0 However, DRA does not support any proposal to site the NBAF on the mainland of the United States. Given the highly contagious nature of the pathogens that will be researched at the NBAF, the inherent level of risk that comes along with those pathogens, and the devastating impact that an outbreak would have on the United States' economy, especially the rural communities, we feel that the only acceptable location for allowing this level of foreign animal disease research to continue is the Plum Island location.

2| 24.1 According to the NBAF Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), a measure of risk exists with the NBAF at all of the proposed locations, and DRA concedes that is necessary for the research to continue. However, the ability all of the proposed sites, other than Plum Island, to

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative based on safety concerns. The NBAF would be designed and constructed using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

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MD0035

control a disease outbreak in the case of an environmental contamination is of grave concern to DRA's members.

The NBAF DEIS Executive Summary states that "For all sites, except the Plum Island Site, the overall risk rank was moderate due to the potential easy spread of a disease through livestock or wildlife. The risk rate for the Plum Island Site was low or none due to the low likelihood of any disease getting off of the island." The Executive summary also concludes that the Plum Island Site is the only site climatically suited to reduce both mosquito infections and the risk of Rift Valley Fever infection due to cooler weather conditions.

The Plum Island Site proposes to use the least amount of fresh water, only 36 million gallons per year as stated in the NBAF DEIS Executive Summary. According to the same source, is also the only proposed location with no measurable Cumulative Effects due to water use, air emissions, water quality, wastewater treatment, or traffic. Both of these points further illustrate reasons for siting the NBAF on the proposed Plum Island location rather than the other proposed sites.

According to USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the economic impacts of Foot and Mouth Disease in the U.S. could cost the economy billions of dollars in the first year, and the NBAF DEIS Executive Summary agrees saying, "the consequences of a release of foot and mouth disease virus indicated that should a large release occur there is a considerable opportunity for the virus to cause infection and become established in the environment beyond the facility boundary." The report continues by stating that the risk is essentially the same for all proposed sites on the mainland but lower for the Plum Island facility based solely on its proximity from livestock populations.

Based on the NBAF Scoping Report, Appendix D, Scoping Meeting Fact Sheets, DRA concludes that the initial cost of building the NBAF on Plum Island could be slightly higher due to the need for additional new and upgraded infrastructure on the island. However, as livestock producers we urge the Department of Homeland Security to commit funds for building the NBAF on Plum Island solely to alleviate the increased risk of contamination that is posed by having this facility on the mainland. Such disease outbreaks have been forecast to cost U.S. livestock producers billions of dollars in the first year alone, warranting the consideration of the Department of Homeland Security.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this important decision, and we again urge you to select the proposed Plum Island Site for the location of the new National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility.

Sincerely,



Jacob Limmer,
Farmer and DRA Board Chair
Lake Norden, SD



Anita Lee,
Rancher and DRA Member,
Sturgis, SD

2 cont. | 24.1

Multiple Signatory Letter 27

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WD0265

From: info@athensfaq.org on behalf of Kevin & Deanna McBurney [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 14, 2008 11:59 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in Athens, Georgia

Dear NBAF Program Manager,

1|25.2 | We are strongly opposed to locating the NBAF facility in our community of Athens, GA.

This year so called "experts" from the University of Georgia urged Elbert County, GA Commissioners not to increase set-back regulation requirements for poultry farms. According to their "professional" opinion, a 300' set-back was sufficient since their tests proved that no odor or particulate could be smelled or was detrimental in any way to surrounding families from that distance.

Needless to say, their absurd (and totally false) stance completely destroyed UGA's credibility where protection of our families and investments are concerned.

2|2.0 | We are now being asked to trust what professionals from UGA and Homeland Security say regarding the safety of locating the NBAF in Athens.

We think not.

The University and our politicians are destroying the goodwill of the people in Clark and surrounding counties by pushing the Athens location. It's time to first consider what the citizens want rather than what is in the best interests of the University, politicians, and special interest groups.

Sincerely,

Kevin & Deanna McBurney
Chelsea & Brandon Norman

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated at any of the six alternatives. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

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Aug 25 05 31:56p

p.1
FD0070

Re: National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility

From: Joe and Kim Mertz

Kansas

To whom it may concern,

We are 5th generation livestock and grain producers living and working in the Manhattan, Kansas area since 1891. Our entire income is derived from agriculture.

We are long standing members of various agricultural organizations including the Kansas Livestock Association, Kansas Farm Bureau, American Simmental Association and the Kansas Simmental Association.

1) 25.4 We are opposed to the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility being proposed for construction in Manhattan, Kansas.

In addition, we carried a petition around our rural neighborhood located 10 miles east of the proposed site. We discovered that 90% of those asked were in opposition to this proposal and signed the petition.

2) 15.4 According to the EIS, in the event of an accidental release of foot- and- mouth virus from this lab, the projected nationwide economic loss to the livestock industry will be in the billions of dollars. We believe the benefits of locating this lab to the mainland **do not outweigh** the potential loss to the livestock industry and the nation's economy.

3) 5.0 We have read the GAO's May 22 report regarding relocating the research on Plum Island to a lab on the mainland. We know they remain unconvinced that foot-and-mouth disease research can safely be done on the mainland. We, as citizens of this country, remain unconvinced, also.


We have read the letter sent to President Bush from Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce urging him to halt construction of all biosafety labs pending a thorough review of safety procedures at existing labs. Clearly there are serious safety concerns that need to be addressed without further complicating the issue by moving dangerous animal research off of Plum Island and onto the mainland.

Until you can remove the potential for human error, we remain unconvinced that this type of lab should be located anywhere on the mainland. We know that you cannot assure us that there will never be human error. For this reason alone, this type of research needs to remain on an island.

4) 5.0 Spend the additional dollars to upgrade the lab on the island, including paying workers more money (so they can afford housing) and paying scientists a salary that will justify their relocation. Whatever the cost, it cannot be near the price of ruining the livestock industry in this country. We haven't even addressed the repercussions of a zoonotic disease infecting the human population: Is it really worth it?????

3 cont) We will continue to oppose the placement of the NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas or anywhere on the mainland for as long as DHS persists in building it on the mainland.

Respectfully,



Kim Mertz and Joe Mertz

Kansas

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The potential biological and socioeconomic effects from a pathogen release from the NBAF are included in Sections 3.8.9 and 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, respectively. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible effects would be significant for all sites. As noted in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D, the major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free. The mainland sites have similar economic consequences regardless of the livestock populations in the region.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 of the EIS show that even though the Plum Island Site Alternative has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.0

As discussed in Section 2.4.1 of the NBAF EIS, the proposed NBAF would require BSL-4 capability. PIADC does not have BSL-4 laboratory space, and the existing infrastructure is inadequate to support a BSL-4 laboratory. Refurbishing the existing facilities and obsolete infrastructure to allow PIADC to meet the new mission would be more costly than building the NBAF on Plum Island. In addition, for the existing facility to be refurbished, current research activities might have to be suspended for extensive periods.

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WD0180

From: Ted K. Miller [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, August 05, 2008 11:17 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in Athens, Georgia

1) 25.2 | We are very much against the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility
 2) 12.2 | being located in Athens, Georgia. Due to drought conditions existing
 3) 8.2 | here, lack of the ability of the infra-structure to handle more demands
 4) 2.0 | on it, and, last but not least, the lack of faith that the Department
 5) 15.2 | of Homeland Security has the capability to ensure that work can be done
 safely in an area where a mishap would be disastrous to the population
 and the economy of the entire state of Georgia, we strongly oppose the
 locating of the unpopular NBAF here.

Gay S. Miller and
 Ted K. Miller

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] Georgia [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 8.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the adequacy of the utility infrastructure to support the NBAF operation at the South Milledge Avenue Site. Section 3.3.3 of the NBAF EIS includes an assessment of the current infrastructure, a discussion of the potential effects from construction and operation of the NBAF, and the identification of any infrastructure improvements necessary to meet design criteria and insure safe operation. Should a site be selected for NBAF, any needed infrastructure improvements to ensure service reliability would be identified in accordance with the final facility design.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of confidence in DHS's ability to safely operate the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and constructed using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 15.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible effects would be significant for all sites. The potential biological and socioeconomic effects from a pathogen release from the NBAF are included in Sections 3.8.9 and 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, respectively.

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WD0248

From: Kay Mills [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 14, 2008 5:12 PM
To: nbafterprogrammanager@dhs.gov
Subject: Flora MS


To whom it may concern:

1/24.5 | Being a lifelong citizen of [REDACTED], I am thrilled to have the chance to have positive jobs
2/15.5 | coming to our area. I welcome the National Bio and Agro Defense Facility to be in Flora,
MS. Citizens of Yazoo City and Yazoo County already commute to jobs in Jackson,
Madison, plus Nissan in Canton and Primos and Dataplex in Flora. Stable, good paying jobs
will be a welcome site to our dwindling city at the Gateway to the Delta and Flora is within
our reach for economic employment. Thank you for considering locating in our wonderful
State.

Sincerely,

Kay and Darell Mills

Kay A. Mills



Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative. The economic effects of the NBAF at the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative are included in Section 3.10.5 of the NBAF EIS. The decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.5

See response for Comment No: 1.

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Aug 25 08 12:20p

p.1

FD0069

RE BIO MEDICAL LAB IN SAN ANTONIO
TEXAS

1| 25.6

To Homeland Security: my entire family is
OPPOSED to the bio-medical facility you want to
ruin our town with. We will leave [REDACTED] if
you install it. Myfe Moore

Jim Moore

James Moore

Jolene Moore

Sydney, Will, and Cassidy Moore

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Tx [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.6

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Texas Research Park Site Alternative.

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PD0256

August 24, 2008

1| 25.4

Yes, we are very much against the NBAF. We own property in Kansas and [REDACTED] County. We have pastures. We raise cattle. All of my sisters' husbands are farmers. My father and mother were farmers. I was raised on a farm with crops and we are very much against this coming because it is not safe – fail safe.

We are very much against the NBAF.

This is Richard and Connie Pickering, [REDACTED] County in [REDACTED], Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative based on safety concerns. The NBAF would be designed and constructed using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.